The new reports on a warning from the UAE President complete a damning picture of endless warnings which Netanyahu and the IDF received of October 7. Here is a list just of what we know publicly:
https://x.com/academic_la/status/2097234611667710008
The new reports on a warning from the UAE President complete a damning picture of endless warnings which Netanyahu and the IDF received of October 7. Here is a list just of what we know publicly:
1) 2017 : Netanyahu presented the Knesset State Control Committee with the threat of a Hamas invasion along the lines of October 7
2) 2018: etanyahu received intelligence on a Hamas plan for an "initiated offensive maneuver with a broad order of battle."
3) April 2022: Israeli intelligence obtained a roughly 40-page Hamas attack plan more than a year before, including the opening rocket barrage, drones disabling border cameras and automated weapons, and gunmen crossing by paraglider, foot and motorcycle.
4) 2022–2023: Over the year before, female observers in Nahal Oz reported suspicious Hamas activity near the fence including efforts to knock out cameras, use of drones, vans and motorcycles, and tank-shelling practice. It fit perfectly with plans Israel knew Hamas had.
5) 2023: A Shin Bet probe credited its analysts with multiple warnings in 2023 that deterrence was crashing, stated it "did not define Hamas as being in a state of being deterred."
6) March 20, 2023: Defense minister Gallant met Netanyahu and warned that Hezbollah and Hamas had identified weakness because of the judicial overhaul rift and an attack was more likely as a result.
7) March–July 2023: Four Military Intelligence letters: the IDF confirmed via a Hatzlacha FOI request that Netanyahu received four warning letters cautioning that deterrence was weakening due to internal division; the July letter warned of "grave new security implications" and adversaries seeing a "historic opportunity to change the strategic balance."
8) July 2023; A unit 8200 NCO warned that a recent Hamas exercise "closely followed the Jericho Wall plan," issued further warnings over the following weeks, and the Gaza Division subsequently prepared a document warning Hamas planned a large-scale invasion with up to 250 hostages. She sent another warning days before October 7 urging preparations.
9) July 23–24, 2023; Shin Bet head Bar called Netanyahu at Sheba on a secure line and said "I am giving you a strategic warning of war," urging him to stop the legislation of judicial overhaul; Halevi sent a letter that IDF readiness "is being rapidly hurt and recovering slowly. This is dangerous." Bar said "I can't give you a day or an hour, but this is the alert."
10) August 21, 2023: Opposition head Yair Lapid cited a joint briefing in which military secretary Avi Gil told Netanyahu and Lapid that Iran and groups in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza "all identified weakness, an internal divide, tensions, and a loss of preparedness in the army, alongside an emerging crisis with the Americans" all making an attack more likely.
11) Early September 2023: Sinwar cut off all contact with the Shin Bet back-channel that Netanyahu had approved and stalled; a senior Shin Bet official described him as vanishing from the radar.
12) September 15, 2023: Bar phoned Netanyahu with Sinwar's earthquake threat relayed via the Fatah intermediary and MBZ's adviser
13) September 17, 2023: security discussion with Gallant and Military Intelligence, then a PMO meeting with Mossad and NSC; Bar recommended a preemptive strike or reinforced defenses since an attack was imminent; no decisions made.
14) Mid-to-late September 2023: The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee were exposed to material that was "unequivocal: Israeli deterrence has eroded dramatically; our enemies think they have a rare opportunity to harm us."
15) September 19, 2023: The Gaza Division circulated a document from Unit 8200 setting out plans to attack bases and communities and take up to 250 hostages, apparently ignored by senior officers
16) Late September 2023: The head of Military Intelligence's "Ipcha Mistabra" unit (devils advocate unit) issued four warnings in the three weeks before October 7 that Hamas would soon launch a confrontation, and claimed two of his written assessments were widely distributed among decision-makers.
17) Late September 2023: Abbas Kamel, head of Egyptian intelligence, called Netanyahu ten days before the attack warning of "something unusual, a terrible operation," and Netanyahu said the military was "submerged" in the West Bank.
18) Late September 2023: MBZ, leader of UAE held a the 45-minute call from Abu Dhabi, and told Netanyahu that Hamas's leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, was planning a major move against Israel. He said he feared the event would bring not only bloodshed but would shake the entire region and damage the Abraham Accords.
19) October 1, 2023: Lapid says Bar recommended preparing for escalation scenarios in Gaza, Halevi advised an operational plan, urgent intelligence warnings existed on Hamas combat preparations, and Netanyahu told them not to strike. Eldar and Yuval add Bar again recommended targeted killings including Sinwar and Netanyahu said "prepare plans and I'll consider"
20) Night of October 6–7: the IDF probe found five anomalous signs including activation of Israeli SIM cards held by Nukhba operatives; not one officer read them as imminent
21) Pre-dawn October 7: The NSC and police were told of unusual Hamas activity and took no action, allowing Nova dance festival to proceed
22) Roughly 5:50 AM: Harel's "6:29" reports warning signs appearing in observation systems and radar about 40 minutes before the attack.
Please explain to me, how did it take 8 hours for the IDF to respond properly to the October 7th attack? That would be far too long even without warning. But with this kind of intense warning of an imminent attack? This was intentional.
https://x.com/academic_la/status/2097234611667710008
posted by Satish Sharma at
14:53
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