The Iranian leadership did not fundamentally change its worldview after the war. If anything, it appears more determined to defend what it considers its core interests.
https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2074696129522884960
We keep coming back to the same fundamental question: What does the U.S. administration actually want?
If Washington's priority is reaching a durable agreement with Iran, it will have to accept that there is no realistic return to the status quo that existed in the Strait of Hormuz before February 28. From Tehran's perspective, the rules of the game have changed, and it is unlikely to reverse course simply because of additional pressure.
If, however, the administration's priority is restoring the previous maritime status quo, then it should also recognize that the chances of a U.S.-Iran agreement decline significantly, while the risk of renewed escalation increases.
The administration cannot pursue both objectives simultaneously. It must decide which one matters more.
The current memorandum of understanding, much like previous interim arrangements elsewhere, was negotiated quickly in order to preserve diplomacy. But the core disputes, including Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz, remain unresolved. Those are not peripheral issues; they are central to both sides' strategic calculations.
The Iranian leadership did not fundamentally change its worldview after the war. If anything, it appears more determined to defend what it considers its core interests.
That is why limited military strikes inside Iran are unlikely, to change Tehran's approach to the Strait of Hormuz. Instead, they risk pushing both sides further away from the negotiated outcome that, at least in principle, both Washington and Tehran still appear to prefer.
That is the difficult reality policymakers need to confront.
#iran
posted by Satish Sharma at
11:26
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