SATISH SHARMA - not just Rotigraphy.: Here's a recap of legal arguments in support of Iran's position on the Strait of Hormuz:

https://x.com/RezaNasri1/status/2059676679199408249

Here's a recap of legal arguments in support of Iran's position on the Strait of Hormuz: 

1) The applicable legal framework must respect the hierarchy of norms in international law: peremptory norms (jus cogens) and core UN Charter principles - including the prohibition of aggression, the ban on the threat or use of force (Art. 2(4)), and the inherent right of self-defence (Art. 51) - sit at the apex and override lower specialised rules of the law of the sea.
  
2) The law of the sea cannot be applied in a vacuum or as a shield to justify aggression or extra-regional military presence; it must be interpreted in light of root causes such as ongoing aggression, military threats, and the Security Council’s failure to restore peace.  

3) Following repeated acts of aggression against Iran (including by the US, Israel, and complicit neighbours), a fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) has occurred, destroying the prior security environment that underpinned voluntary comity-based passage and rendering unconditional facilitation of passage unsustainable.
  
4) The presence of extensive US and allied military bases across the region (Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) has transformed the Strait into a component of a hostile military theatre rather than a neutral international corridor, depriving it of the neutrality required for any unconditional transit-passage regime; this situation is incompatible with the legal presuppositions of such a regime and finds support in ICJ jurisprudence such as the Nicaragua case on threats of force.  

5) Iran is not a party to UNCLOS 1982 and has been a consistent persistent objector to the transit-passage regime (Articles 37–44) since signature, as formally declared and reinforced through continuous legislative and diplomatic practice; therefore, even if transit passage were customary, Iran is not bound by it.  

6) In the absence of a binding transit-passage obligation, the governing regime reverts to the customary right of innocent passage (as recognised by the ICJ in the 1949 Corfu Channel case and earlier 1958 Geneva rules), which is more restrictive and expressly allows the coastal State to regulate, condition, or prevent passage that is not innocent, particularly for warships, submarines, or vessels posing security or environmental risks. 
 
7) Coastal-State sovereignty over the territorial sea remains complete and fundamental, even within an international strait; this includes the right to adopt laws and measures necessary to protect national security, public order, the environment and safety of navigation, as affirmed in customary law, the 1958/1982 conventions’ recognition of historic rights in semi-enclosed seas, and ICJ practice (e.g., Qatar v. Bahrain on historic title).
  
8) Iran and Oman possess long-standing historic title over the Strait of Hormuz through centuries of continuous, peaceful exercise of sovereignty, further strengthening the coastal States’ authority to manage and regulate passage.  

9) International law does not require a coastal State to allow its own territorial waters to serve as a conduit for hostile military operations or aggression against itself; in the current context of military threats, armed conflict and self-defence, conditioning passage on neutrality and non-hostility is a proportionate and lawful measure.  

10) Iran’s new arrangements represent a balanced, conditional framework aimed at restoring equilibrium between safe international navigation and the coastal State’s legitimate security imperatives; they are consistent with the principle that the law of the sea is not a “suicide pact” and must adapt to fundamentally altered strategic realities.