Why I Wholeheartedly Oppose the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism What the Definition Actually Says

 Ajmal Masroor

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Why I Wholeheartedly Oppose the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism

What the Definition Actually Says

The IHRA Working Definition (adopted 2016) reads: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” It is accompanied by eleven “contemporary examples,” of which seven relate to the State of Israel.

Problem 1: The Core Definition is Remarkably Vague

The phrase “a certain perception of Jews” is philosophically almost meaningless. The first thing I did when I saw this definition was to explore the word “perception.” What does it mean? A quick Google search revealed the following: “at its core, perception is the process by which an organism gathers, identifies, and interprets sensory information to understand the surrounding environment.” I decided to check further and found that the Cambridge Online Dictionary offers a simpler definition: “a belief or opinion, often held by many people and based on how things seem.”

The first instinctive reaction to the definition of antisemitism is that it is trying to place a judgement on my feelings, beliefs, or opinions. In other words, I am being told what I can believe or not, feel or not feel, or what opinion I can hold or not. It is attempting to police my thoughts and even my feelings. That is a red flag for me.

If I suspend my negative perceptions of the definition and look more closely and objectively, I still find many problems with it.

The first problem is that it does not specify what kind of perception, how severe, or how demonstrable. Legal scholars have pointed out that a definition designed to guide institutions, governments, and courts needs precision, not ambiguity. Critics note that because the IHRA definition is unclear in key respects and widely open to different interpretations, it has caused confusion and generated controversy — the very opposite of what a definition should achieve.

Problem 2: It Conflates Anti-Zionism with Antisemitism

This is the most serious and contested flaw in this definition. Seven of the eleven illustrative examples concern Israel, not Jews as a people. Among the examples cited with the definition, I found the following statement extremely disturbing — and most critics find it the most contested too: we are told that if anyone claims “the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour,” he or she is antisemitic. Critics argue that by treating this as an example of antisemitism, anyone who adopts this definition will stifle legitimate debate about the Israel-Palestine conflict. In fact, those of us who are genuine advocates of freedom for all people generally, and for Palestinians in particular, find this example alone sufficient reason to reject the IHRA definition.

This is a profound error. Zionism is a political ideology, not a religious identity or ethnic characteristic. One can criticise Zionism — as many Jews historically did and still do — on entirely principled, non-racial grounds. Conflating the two collapses the distinction between racism — hating people for who they are — and political disagreement — opposing a state’s founding ideology or conduct.

As many as seven of the eleven illustrations the IHRA definition marshals to exemplify antisemitism relate to post-1948 Israel. This disproportionate focus on a state rather than a people reveals the political rather than scholarly motivation behind the definition’s construction. In my view, the definition of antisemitism has been weaponised by those who wholeheartedly subscribe to Zionism as a political ideology and who have nothing to do with Judaism as a religion.

Problem 3: It Was Not Designed as a Legal Instrument but is Being Used as One

The IHRA definition is explicitly non-legally binding — described as a “working definition.” Yet it is increasingly being imposed as binding policy on universities, public bodies, and now, through executive and legislative pressure, on entire national systems. The Trump administration’s pressure on universities to adopt the IHRA definition, and its targeting of international students for visa revocation and deportation, is being described by critics as amounting to McCarthyism.

When a vague, politically contested document designed for awareness-raising becomes the test for whether someone faces institutional discipline or loses funding, the stakes of its imprecision become very high indeed. I am under no illusion that far too many unsavoury people have used this definition to cancel, ban, and deny people their basic human right to freedom of expression and belief.

Problem 4: It Suppresses Palestinian and Pro-Palestinian Speech

This definition takes away the freedom of people to advocate for Palestine. Critics say the definition can enable the weaponisation of antisemitism to stifle free speech regarding Israel, and argue that it obstructs campaigning for the rights of Palestinians.

This creates an asymmetry: speech about virtually any other ethno-national conflict enjoys normal political latitude, but speech about Israel and Palestine is uniquely policed. A Kashmiri, Uyghur, or Tibetan solidarity activist faces no comparable definitional trap. Why should we be silenced on the most pressing moral issue of our time — the occupation of Palestine and the genocide of the people of Gaza?

It is explicitly demonstrated within the definition and the examples cited that the architects of this definition have a clear intention of silencing pro-Palestinian campaigns by packaging it within the antisemitism mantra. The impact of this dubious approach is that many innocent people are being criminalised for speaking up for Palestine, and many others are being silenced out of fear of punishment.

Problem 5: It Lacks Scholarly Consensus

Despite being promoted as the consensus view, the IHRA definition has failed to win broad academic support. A range of scholars, jurists, civil liberties campaigners, and progressive Jewish groups have criticised its examples. In response, over 200 leading scholars in Holocaust studies, Jewish studies, and Middle East studies produced the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) as an explicit corrective. The JDA states that the IHRA definition “is neither clear nor coherent” and “blurs the difference between antisemitic speech and legitimate criticism of Israel and Zionism,” delegitimising the voices of Palestinians and others, including Jews, who hold sharply critical views of Israel.

Problem 6: It Displaces Focus from Real Antisemitism

Perhaps the most damaging irony: by centring the definition on Israel rather than on the lived reality of Jewish communities facing actual hatred — from the far right, from white nationalist movements, from conspiracy theorists — the IHRA definition arguably weakens the fight against real antisemitism. Critics argue that a totally distorted picture of antisemitism is created, one that presents expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle as evidence of rampant antisemitism, while diverting attention from the real and growing threat of antisemitic hatred emanating from the far right.

I will never propagate hatred of any people based on their race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, or religion. Indeed, in my understanding of my faith, Islam, such behaviour is clearly prohibited. However, I have every right to be critical of any religion, ideology, or belief. I can challenge these ideas and beliefs without personalising the people who hold them. To criticise Zionism, or to call it a racist, fascist, and supremacist political idea, is not antisemitism. To call Zionism a secular, anti-God, and anti-Judaism movement is factually accurate and is not antisemitism.

Antisemitism is to actively engage in anti-Jewish activity — conduct that may cause harm to Jewish people because of their race or religion. If criticism of Judaism as a religion is to be called antisemitism, then its proponents are introducing blasphemy laws through the back door, and only for the protection of Judaism. This is inconsistent with and in direct contradiction to the broader narrative of abolishing blasphemy laws.

Defenders’ Counterargument

To be fair to the definition’s proponents: they argue it does not prohibit criticism of Israel, that it explicitly states “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic,” and that denial of Jewish collective self-determination is a form of antisemitism with deep historical roots. These are not trivial points. The truth is that Jewish collective self-determination cannot be achieved by committing ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Palestinians. It cannot be achieved by invoking a biblical promise of God granting Palestinian and surrounding lands exclusively to one race. It cannot be achieved through occupation, dehumanisation, and oppression of another nation.

Conclusion

The IHRA definition is no more than a proposal — a working definition, a consciousness-raising document, or a consensus-developing instrument. It is not a legal definition, nor is it a constitutional one. Its problems arise not from its intentions but from its deployment: a vague, politically constructed, and weaponised text being applied as a quasi-legal instrument to silence political speech, suppress Palestinian solidarity, and conflate a state’s policies with a people’s dignity. The definition tells us more about the political pressures of the moment in which it was written than about the ancient evil it purports to define and correct. Its attempt to solve the antisemitism problem by colluding with Zionism is its actual downfall. Jewish communities must reject Zionism and join hands with people across the world to fight antisemitism.

No definition is worth the paper it is written on if its impact is so visibly destructive, counterproductive, and unworkable. I say we should bin this definition and start afresh.