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https://x.com/ibrahimtmajed/status/2019442868528582877
ππ₯ππ‘ ππ‘π π§ππ π¦π¬π¦π§ππ π’π ππ‘πππ₯πππ§ πͺππ₯: ππ’πͺ ππ ππ₯πππ π¦ππππ¦ π§π’ πͺπππππ‘ ππ₯ππ‘ ππ¬ πππ¦π ππ‘π§πππ‘π ππ§π¦ π₯ππππ’π‘ππ π¦ππππππ¦
The United States is unlikely to launch a direct military strike against Iran in the near term.
Not because it lacks capability, but because it lacks strategic conditions.
Washington understands that a direct strike on Iran, under current regional alignments, would not remain a bilateral confrontation.
Iran has made this explicit: any attack would trigger a regional war, activating multiple fronts simultaneously and collapsing escalation control.
The American response to this reality is not restraint, but sequencing.
Rather than confronting Iran at the center, the strategy aims to degrade the periphery, fracture Iranβs regional depth, and isolate Tehran before any direct confrontation becomes thinkable.
This is not a plan for immediate victory, but for preβwar conditioning.
π§ππ ππ’π₯π ππ’πππ: πͺπππππ‘ π§ππ ππππππ¦ π§π’ π¦π§π₯ππ‘πππ π§ππ πππ‘π§ππ₯
Iranβs power is not built on isolated strength.
It is built on networked deterrence.
Hezbollah in Lebanon, resistance forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen together form an integrated system that:
- Expands Iranβs strategic depth
- Multiplies retaliation pathways
- Raises the cost of direct confrontation
As long as this system remains intact, Iran cannot be struck without uncontrollable escalation.
The American strategy therefore does not target Iran first.
It targets the system that protects Iran.
π¦π¬π₯ππ: π π π¨ππ§πβπ¨π¦π π£π₯ππ¦π¦π¨π₯π ππ‘π π¦π§π₯πππ ππ’π₯π₯πππ’π₯
Syria is not treated as a war to be resolved, but as a permanent strategic instrument.
Its function is threefold: a pressure platform against Iranβs allies in Iraq and Lebanon, a corridor for destabilization through controlled insecurity, and a geographic pathway enabling Israeli reach toward Iran.
By maintaining Syria in a fragmented, penetrable state, the United States preserves a forward operating environment from which pressure can be applied eastward into western Iraq, disrupting resistance logistics and cohesion, and westward toward Lebanonβs eastern borders, forcing Hezbollah into constant defensive allocation.
Residual extremist formations are not eradicated but managed, recycled as mobile friction tools that generate instability without requiring formal escalation.
At the same time, Syrian airspace and terrain provide Israel with operational depth and routing flexibility, reducing strategic distance to Iran and integrating Syria into the broader strike geometry.
In this configuration, Syria acts simultaneously as a choke point, a pressure valve, and a launch corridor, not a battlefield to conclude, but a lever to keep permanently engaged.
πππππ‘π’π‘: ππππ₯ππππ‘π πππ§ππ₯π₯ππ‘ππ πͺππ§ππ’π¨π§ πͺππ₯
Hezbollah represents the most immediate and credible deterrent against Israel and, by extension, against a direct strike on Iran.
The objective in Lebanon is therefore not total defeat, which would require a catastrophic war, but progressive exhaustion.
This is pursued through:
- Sustained Israeli military pressure below full-scale war thresholds
- Economic suffocation of the Lebanese state environment
- Eastern border destabilization linked to the Syrian theater
- Psychological warfare aimed at stretching Hezbollah across multiple axes
The goal is to force Hezbollah into a condition of strategic saturation: always mobilized, always reactive, never fully consolidated.
A Hezbollah constantly defending Lebanese territory, borders, and internal stability, is a Hezbollah less capable of fulfilling its role as a central pillar of Iranβs regional deterrence architecture.
ππ₯ππ€: π§ππ πππ‘π§ππ₯ π’π ππ₯ππ©ππ§π¬
Iraq is the most critical piece of the puzzle.
Geographically, it links Iran to Syria and Lebanon.
Economically, it sits atop vast energy resources.
Strategically, it hosts both American military presence and powerful resistance forces.
For the United States, Iraq must remain weak, divided, and dependent.
A strong, sovereign Iraq aligned with Iran would:
- Secure land corridors
- Undermine U.S. military positioning
- Remove leverage over energy markets
- Provide Iran with strategic depth westward
Therefore, American policy focuses on:
- Containing and fragmenting resistance forces
- Preventing full political consolidation
- Maintaining security dependence on U.S. presence
- Preserving control over energy and financial channels
Iraq is not merely a theater, it is the hinge upon which the entire regional balance turns.
π¬ππ ππ‘: π ππ₯ππ§ππ π πππ’πππ£π’ππ‘π§ ππ‘π πππ©ππ¦ππ’π‘ π¦π§π₯ππ§πππ¬
Yemen occupies a different but equally critical domain: the sea.
Control over Bab alβMandab is control over one of the worldβs most vital maritime arteries.
Ansar Allahβs ability to threaten this passage transforms Yemen from a peripheral conflict into a global pressure point.
The strategic response is not outright defeat, but division.
By pushing toward the creation of a Southern Yemen entity, and by advancing the recognition of Somaliland, Washington and its partners aim to:
- Control Bab alβMandab from two sides
- Encircle and isolate Ansar Allah geographically
- Reduce Yemenβs ability to act as a unified maritime actor
- Neutralize one of Iranβs most disruptive indirect assets
This is maritime containment masquerading as political resolution.
π§ππ ππ‘ππππ π: ππ¦π’πππ§ππ‘π ππ₯ππ‘
Only once Iranβs allies are weakened, overstretched, and compartmentalized does the final phase become conceivable.
At that point, Iran faces:
- Reduced retaliatory capacity
- Fragmented regional support
- Limited escalation pathways
- Increased vulnerability to air and missile campaigns
The strike on Iran, if it comes, is intended to be decisive because it is delayed.
ππ₯ππ‘βπ¦ πππ¦π¦π’π‘: π§ππ π‘πππ ππ’π₯ π¦π§π₯π’π‘π π₯ππ¦ππ¦π§ππ‘ππ
This strategy reminds Iran of what Ayotallah Khomeini implied during the Iran-Iraq war: the revolution must be exported, or America will destroy any attempt to break free from its hegemony.
With U.S. actions now openly targeting liberation forces, the most effective defense for Iran is stronger allies across the region, politically and militarily. Weakening Hezbollah, or other regional partners undermines Iranβs security and validates the principle that resistance must remain robust everywhere.
Consequently, regional political structures may change under the existential necessity of countering American pressure.
The current form of some states, like the UAE or Jordan or Bahrain, may not remain acceptable to Iran or its allies after this process unfolds.
π§ππ π₯ππ¦π: π¦π¬π¦π§ππ ππ πππ’πͺππππ
This strategy assumes that fragmentation can be controlled, that instability can be localized, and that escalation can be managed indefinitely.
History suggests otherwise.
Sectarian wars do not remain contained.
Proxy forces develop autonomy. Maritime disruptions ripple globally.
Fragmented states generate unpredictable actors.
By attempting to weaken Iran through indirect regional fires, the United States and Israel risk igniting a configuration of conflict too complex to dominate and too distributed to shut down.
What is being constructed may not be a path to control,
but a system of permanent regional volatility.
And systems, once unleashed, do not obey their architects.
π§ππ ππ’π₯π ππ’πππ: πͺπππππ‘ π§ππ ππππππ¦ π§π’ π¦π§π₯ππ‘πππ π§ππ πππ‘π§ππ₯
Iranβs power is not built on isolated strength.
It is built on networked deterrence.
Hezbollah in Lebanon, resistance forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen together form an integrated system that:
- Expands Iranβs strategic depth
- Multiplies retaliation pathways
- Raises the cost of direct confrontation
As long as this system remains intact, Iran cannot be struck without uncontrollable escalation.
The American strategy therefore does not target Iran first.
It targets the system that protects Iran.
π¦π¬π₯ππ: π π π¨ππ§πβπ¨π¦π π£π₯ππ¦π¦π¨π₯π ππ‘π π¦π§π₯πππ ππ’π₯π₯πππ’π₯
Syria is not treated as a war to be resolved, but as a permanent strategic instrument.
Its function is threefold: a pressure platform against Iranβs allies in Iraq and Lebanon, a corridor for destabilization through controlled insecurity, and a geographic pathway enabling Israeli reach toward Iran.
By maintaining Syria in a fragmented, penetrable state, the United States preserves a forward operating environment from which pressure can be applied eastward into western Iraq, disrupting resistance logistics and cohesion, and westward toward Lebanonβs eastern borders, forcing Hezbollah into constant defensive allocation.
Residual extremist formations are not eradicated but managed, recycled as mobile friction tools that generate instability without requiring formal escalation.
At the same time, Syrian airspace and terrain provide Israel with operational depth and routing flexibility, reducing strategic distance to Iran and integrating Syria into the broader strike geometry.
In this configuration, Syria acts simultaneously as a choke point, a pressure valve, and a launch corridor, not a battlefield to conclude, but a lever to keep permanently engaged.
πππππ‘π’π‘: ππππ₯ππππ‘π πππ§ππ₯π₯ππ‘ππ πͺππ§ππ’π¨π§ πͺππ₯
Hezbollah represents the most immediate and credible deterrent against Israel and, by extension, against a direct strike on Iran.
The objective in Lebanon is therefore not total defeat, which would require a catastrophic war, but progressive exhaustion.
This is pursued through:
- Sustained Israeli military pressure below full-scale war thresholds
- Economic suffocation of the Lebanese state environment
- Eastern border destabilization linked to the Syrian theater
- Psychological warfare aimed at stretching Hezbollah across multiple axes
The goal is to force Hezbollah into a condition of strategic saturation: always mobilized, always reactive, never fully consolidated.
A Hezbollah constantly defending Lebanese territory, borders, and internal stability, is a Hezbollah less capable of fulfilling its role as a central pillar of Iranβs regional deterrence architecture.
ππ₯ππ€: π§ππ πππ‘π§ππ₯ π’π ππ₯ππ©ππ§π¬
Iraq is the most critical piece of the puzzle.
Geographically, it links Iran to Syria and Lebanon.
Economically, it sits atop vast energy resources.
Strategically, it hosts both American military presence and powerful resistance forces.
For the United States, Iraq must remain weak, divided, and dependent.
A strong, sovereign Iraq aligned with Iran would:
- Secure land corridors
- Undermine U.S. military positioning
- Remove leverage over energy markets
- Provide Iran with strategic depth westward
Therefore, American policy focuses on:
- Containing and fragmenting resistance forces
- Preventing full political consolidation
- Maintaining security dependence on U.S. presence
- Preserving control over energy and financial channels
Iraq is not merely a theater, it is the hinge upon which the entire regional balance turns.
π¬ππ ππ‘: π ππ₯ππ§ππ π πππ’πππ£π’ππ‘π§ ππ‘π πππ©ππ¦ππ’π‘ π¦π§π₯ππ§πππ¬
Yemen occupies a different but equally critical domain: the sea.
Control over Bab alβMandab is control over one of the worldβs most vital maritime arteries.
Ansar Allahβs ability to threaten this passage transforms Yemen from a peripheral conflict into a global pressure point.
The strategic response is not outright defeat, but division.
By pushing toward the creation of a Southern Yemen entity, and by advancing the recognition of Somaliland, Washington and its partners aim to:
- Control Bab alβMandab from two sides
- Encircle and isolate Ansar Allah geographically
- Reduce Yemenβs ability to act as a unified maritime actor
- Neutralize one of Iranβs most disruptive indirect assets
This is maritime containment masquerading as political resolution.
π§ππ ππ‘ππππ π: ππ¦π’πππ§ππ‘π ππ₯ππ‘
Only once Iranβs allies are weakened, overstretched, and compartmentalized does the final phase become conceivable.
At that point, Iran faces:
- Reduced retaliatory capacity
- Fragmented regional support
- Limited escalation pathways
- Increased vulnerability to air and missile campaigns
The strike on Iran, if it comes, is intended to be decisive because it is delayed.
ππ₯ππ‘βπ¦ πππ¦π¦π’π‘: π§ππ π‘πππ ππ’π₯ π¦π§π₯π’π‘π π₯ππ¦ππ¦π§ππ‘ππ
This strategy reminds Iran of what Ayotallah Khomeini implied during the Iran-Iraq war: the revolution must be exported, or America will destroy any attempt to break free from its hegemony.
With U.S. actions now openly targeting liberation forces, the most effective defense for Iran is stronger allies across the region, politically and militarily. Weakening Hezbollah, or other regional partners undermines Iranβs security and validates the principle that resistance must remain robust everywhere.
Consequently, regional political structures may change under the existential necessity of countering American pressure.
The current form of some states, like the UAE or Jordan or Bahrain, may not remain acceptable to Iran or its allies after this process unfolds.
π§ππ π₯ππ¦π: π¦π¬π¦π§ππ ππ πππ’πͺππππ
This strategy assumes that fragmentation can be controlled, that instability can be localized, and that escalation can be managed indefinitely.
History suggests otherwise.
Sectarian wars do not remain contained.
Proxy forces develop autonomy. Maritime disruptions ripple globally.
Fragmented states generate unpredictable actors.
By attempting to weaken Iran through indirect regional fires, the United States and Israel risk igniting a configuration of conflict too complex to dominate and too distributed to shut down.
What is being constructed may not be a path to control,
but a system of permanent regional volatility.
And systems, once unleashed, do not obey their architects.
posted by Satish Sharma at
00:55
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