President Trump believes that Greenland would make the United States more powerful. However, the opposite is more likely to happen.

 https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/2012843845239681261

Anton Gerashchenko

@Gerashchenko_en

Friends, what kind of arguments are important on the issue of Greenland, in your opinion? Evidently, President Trump believes that Greenland would make the United States more powerful. However, the opposite is more likely to happen. Real capabilities in the Arctic are determined not just by the "flag over territory." The Arctic is a theater where control consists of three layers: physical presence, the ability to sustain and support that presence over time, and the capacity to restrict competitors’ access. Owning Greenland could primarily strengthen the U.S. at the entrance to the Arctic from the Atlantic - serving as a base for operations, monitoring, and the creation of a logistics hub. At the same time, it does not automatically grant control over the main Arctic routes: the Northern Sea Route (NSR) remains a Russian-controlled corridor along the Russian coast, while the Northwest Passage (NWP) is a Canadian archipelago with legal ambiguities that will not disappear simply from a change in Greenland’s status. Let us consider three possible scenarios for President Trump’s Greenland venture: In the most positive scenario, where the U.S. gains sovereign control over Greenland while maintaining transatlantic cooperation, the gain for Washington is complete - both operational-logistical and regulatory. The U.S. could expand dual-use infrastructure and communications channels more rapidly and without political approvals, effectively turning the island into its own logistics node in the North Atlantic. Additionally, the "denial" tool is strengthened: sovereignty allows for stricter control over third-party access to ports, data, and critical infrastructure, and faster blocking of unwanted investments. In terms of resources, this would also facilitate access to rare earths and a broader package of critical materials. However, a more likely scenario is that an annexation of Greenland would be accompanied by a rupture in transatlantic security cooperation. In this case, the U.S. might strengthen control over a single node but weaken overall regional control. The tactical benefit is clear: an autonomous foothold with maximum sovereign control over licenses, investors, and access regimes to resources, creating a stronger barrier to Chinese presence on the island. Yet the strategic losses emerge primarily in logistics: the Arctic requires not just points on a map, but a network of ports, repair facilities, air corridors, joint SAR systems, and continuous data exchange. A rupture with Europe would mean the loss of this "logistical depth," resulting in a more expensive, slower, and less predictable U.S. presence at high latitudes, which would have to be maintained independently, with increased stockpiles, supply ships, and contract infrastructure, while simultaneously raising insurance and operational costs. In terms of resources, such a rupture could devalue part of the gains from controlling rare earth materials. Sovereignty over deposits does not equal stable supplies: critical materials require long investment cycles, processing technologies, standards, and markets. Without a partnership with the EU, financial and regulatory risks rise, the "legitimacy" of extraction falls, and projects become more toxic to investors due to political conflict and potential European countermeasures. In the end, the situation could become "resources exist, supply chain does not": the U.S. controls access and licenses but faces delays in actual extraction and processing, meaning geological assets are not converted into strategic supplies for high-tech and defense. Systemically, this scenario also shifts the security balance in favor of Russia. Even if the U.S. strictly limits Chinese presence in Greenland, a divided West opens a broader space for Moscow to create "grey zones" in the North Atlantic and Arctic - from pressure on underwater infrastructure to navigation incidents and shows of force, which become more dangerous in the absence of coordinated allied responses. The main dilemma thus emerges: annexation increases U.S. freedom on the island, but a transatlantic rupture undermines the key prerequisite for Arctic power - network resilience and the ability to sustain a presence over time, efficiently and cost-effectively, in the most challenging theater of modern geopolitics. Simply put, in terms of raw power and numbers, the U.S. and its allies are already lagging behind Russia in Arctic capabilities: Russia has about 40 icebreakers, including 8 nuclear-powered, while the U.S. has only 2 polar icebreakers, with the main reinforcement coming from allies: Canada (18 icebreakers), Finland (8), and Sweden (5). However, in sensors, the undersea domain, and networked logistics, the advantage lies with the U.S. and its allies thanks to integrated North Atlantic infrastructure and NORAD networks. If transatlantic cooperation is severed, the U.S. retains high-tech advantages (sensors, space, and undersea domains) but loses the main compensator - the "icebreaker gap," meaning allied logistics and industrial-operational support. In that case, Russia’s advantage in sustaining surface presence in ice (40/8 vs. 2) becomes far more decisive for actual control in the Arctic.

Last edited10:05 PM · Jan 18, 2026

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https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/2012843845239681261