Saturday, 17 January 2026

Five Recurring Fallacies in Israeli Hasbara Discourse

 Palestinian Historiographical Research is a platform dedicated to the academic study of Palestine’s history, memory, and narratives.


Five Recurring Fallacies in Israeli Hasbara Discourse

Introduction
In the case of Israel, hasbara—Israeli official and semi-official communication directed at international audiences—systematises a series of logical fallacies that serve specific political and communicative functions: diverting attention, relativising evidence, generating epistemic confusion, or diluting responsibility. This article presents five of the most frequent fallacies identified by specialists in political communication, rhetoric, and critical conflict studies (Tilley, 2012; Finkelstein, 2018; Herman & Chomsky, 2002), illustrated with contemporary examples linked to findings by institutions such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, B’Tselem, and United Nations Special Rapporteurs. These bodies have identified systematic patterns in Israeli military actions in Gaza consistent with war crimes and acts that may be classified as genocide (Amnesty International, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2024; B’Tselem, 2021; United Nations, 2024).
The Five Fallacies
1. The Whataboutism Fallacy
The whataboutism fallacy (or “what about…?”) is a variant of the tu quoque or ad hominem fallacy. It consists of responding to an accusation not by directly refuting its substance, but by diverting attention toward alleged hypocrisies or failings of another party that are irrelevant to the original argument. This tactic distracts from the central issue and avoids accountability (Walton, 1998; Christensen, 2019). In hasbara discourse, this strategy seeks to deflect attention away from facts documented by specialised institutions toward logically unrelated comparisons, creating a false moral symmetry and eroding the credibility of criticism.
Example 1: When a report is published documenting bombardments of densely populated areas resulting in large numbers of civilian deaths, official spokespersons respond with statements such as: “But why don’t you talk about what’s happening in Syria?” or “Why don’t you condemn Iran?” This does not refute any of the report’s findings; it merely changes the subject to avoid confronting the evidence presented.
Example 2: Faced with allegations of serious violations based on the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responds on social media: “Where were these voices when Assad was massacring his people in Aleppo?” In doing so, it ignores the specific context and differences in the scale of civilian casualties.
2. False Moral Equivalence
False moral equivalence is a subtype of the false equivalence fallacy. It consists of presenting two actions or phenomena that differ significantly in scale, context, intention, or moral impact as if they were equal or comparable, thereby creating an illusion of symmetry that minimises the gravity of one side’s actions (Lee, 2020; Perugini & Gordon, 2019). This fallacy ignores qualitative and quantitative differences in order to construct artificially balanced narratives.
Example 1: In response to reports documenting massive destruction of civilian infrastructure and a high proportion of women and children among the victims, Israeli spokespersons state: “Both sides commit excesses.” This creates a non-existent symmetry, as the evidence shows a profound asymmetry in military capacity, civilian death tolls, and material destruction.
Example 2: Following requests for arrest warrants for war crimes, hasbara advocates in Western media equate an initial attack that killed hundreds of people with a military response that caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths, disregarding the disproportionality in military power and the context of prolonged occupation.
3. The Straw Man Fallacy
The straw man fallacy consists of distorting, exaggerating, or oversimplifying an opponent’s position in order to create a caricatured and weaker version of the original argument, which can then be easily refuted as if it were the real claim. This avoids engaging with the valid point and instead emotionally discredits the opponent (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; Talisse & Aikin, 2006). It is particularly effective in polarised discourse.
Example 1: When UN rapporteurs point to reasonable indications of genocidal intent based on public statements and siege policies, the hasbara response is: “They are saying Israel is the same as the Nazis.” No institution makes this claim explicitly, but the argument is distorted to discredit it emotionally.
Example 2: In response to reports documenting a regime of supremacy and systematic discrimination, spokespersons reframe the critique as: “They want to destroy the Jewish state and deny Israel’s right to defend itself.” This transforms a demand for equal rights into an extremist position, making it easier to refute through historical references while avoiding the evidence of discrimination.
4. Appeal to Existential Threat
The appeal to existential threat is a fallacy of distraction and fear that frames any criticism or adverse action—regardless of its factual basis or proportionality—as an imminent danger to the survival of the state or the people. This blocks rational evaluation of the facts through emotional appeals to absolute self-defence (Bar-Tal, 2013; Jonas et al., 2014). This rhetoric, grounded in narratives of perpetual victimhood, justifies disproportionate responses by prioritising collective panic over empirical analysis.
Example 1: When confronted with reports on high rates of child mortality caused by military actions, Israeli representatives claim that accepting such criticism “puts the existence of the Jewish state at risk,” equating humanitarian scrutiny with support for “existential terrorism.” Any technical assessment is thus recast as an attack on identity.
Example 2: In response to UN reports on possible indications of genocide, the Prime Minister declares that global protests against actions in Gaza represent “an existential threat to Israeli democracy,” portraying demonstrations for Palestinian rights as a plot to delegitimise Israel’s right to exist, without addressing evidence of humanitarian blockade or indiscriminate bombardment.
5. Reduction of the Enemy to Absolute Evil (Inverse Demonisation)
Reduction of the enemy to absolute evil, or inverse demonisation, is an ad hominem and generalisation fallacy that attributes all civilian harm exclusively to the inherent evil or deliberate tactics of the adversary, while denying or minimising one’s own responsibility and omitting externally verifiable evidence. It serves to rationalise serious violations as inevitable or deserved (Tilley, 2012; Knightley, 2000). This tactic dehumanises the opponent and promotes a Manichaean narrative of absolute good versus absolute evil.
Example 1: Following strikes that hit hospitals or humanitarian convoys without documented nearby armed activity, official spokespersons claim: “Hamas uses all civilians as human shields,” without providing verifiable evidence for the specific case. The generic accusation replaces an analysis of avoidable collateral damage.
Example 2: During assaults on medical complexes, even when independent investigations find no active military command centres or significant military use at the site, hasbara insists that “Hamas demonically hides operations in hospitals to force civilian casualties,” thereby justifying the destruction of healthcare infrastructure without specific evidence, contributing to thousands of civilian deaths.
Conclusion
The five fallacies analysed here serve clear political functions within the communicative apparatus of hasbara: diverting attention from rigorous allegations toward emotional narratives, artificial symmetries, or rhetorical distortions. While the existence of these tactics does not automatically validate every allegation, it does reveal a systematic pattern of responses designed to avoid rigorous public evaluation grounded in technical and international reports. Understanding these fallacies is not an ideological act; it is simply the first step in avoiding them—particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict.
References
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Amnesty International. (2024). Israel/OPT: Report on possible international law crimes in Gaza.
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Christensen, C. (2019). Whataboutism as a propaganda tool. In D. Freedman & J. P. Freedman (Eds.), Propaganda and persuasion (pp. 45–62). Routledge.
Finkelstein, N. (2018). Gaza: An inquest into its martyrdom. University of California Press.
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Perugini, N., & Gordon, N. (2019). The human right to dominate. Oxford University Press.
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van Eemeren, F., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. Cambridge University Press.
Walton, D. (1998). Ad hominem arguments. University of Alabama Press.

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