‘Ukraine maximalists’ on the Right still dominate. But for how long?

Their position is eroding as more Republicans are worried about the threat of escalation and the diminishment of other US priorities.

FEBRUARY 23, 2023

Written by
William Ruger

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With the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991, we might have expected there to be a profound rethinking of American foreign policy. The Soviet Union was dead, largely through self-immolation. The United States — in its unipolar moment — was now free from the systemic pressures that had led it during the Cold War to build a massive military and shelter an array of allies.   

But very little new thinking emerged. Scholars like Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington mused about the end of history and the clash of civilizations. President George H.W. Bush talked about a New World Order. But elites on both the Left and the Right chose not to seriously wrestle with the significance of this power shift. 

What happened instead was more a continuation of the past than a shift from it. Old assumptions and theories about the nature of the world that had dominated during the Cold War became fixed and hardened in the minds of the foreign policy establishment. Rather than a time of rethinking, our Cold War approach was put on steroids. Elites served up a variety of rationales, first the problem of rogue states, followed by global terrorism and the responsibility to protect, and now great power competition.  Unsurprisingly, the strategy (and budgets) for each of these problems were similar: primacy.  

Unfortunately for America, something not very funny happened on the way to the imperial forum.  We kept getting frustrated or worse, whether in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and many other places across the globe.  The world simply wouldn’t conform to our desires. This put primacy in trouble as more and more people — including one Donald Trump — questioned whether it was good for America. They wondered whether a different, more restrained approach might be better. They eventually came to support the end of our misadventures in the Middle East, and U.S. withdrawal from the war in Afghanistan in 2021 suggested a new future for American foreign policy.     

Then the Russia-Ukraine War began, one year ago.  

This conflict reinvigorated the primacists on both sides of our ideological divide. The primacists had been on the back foot as their theories failed test after test in the Middle East and our allies in Europe and Asia resisted our calls for burden sharing. Before the Russian invasion, restraint was the cool kid on the block and gaining momentum. On the Right, the Trump years had forced conservative primacists to play defense and try to maintain their control (through pushback on Capitol Hill and even by thwarting the president from within his own administration). But if the fight over Afghanistan was Star Wars with its (temporary) victory for the rebel alliance against the forces of primacy, Ukraine has been the Empire Strikes Back.       

Once the Ukraine conflict commenced, primacists on the Right eagerly waved away our failures in the Middle East and embraced an intense, aggressively pro-Ukraine position that initially faced little challenge. We might call these people “Ukraine maximalists” since simply calling them pro-Ukrainian wouldn’t be fair to their critics who aren’t anti-Ukraine per se but worry more about the consequences for America of the more aggressive approach that the maximalists take.  

Today, the Ukraine maximalists are still in the driver’s seat in the policy debate. In coalition with Biden and the Democrats (with progressive restraint largely MIA), they maintain great power to impact the U.S.’s approach to Ukraine. But their position is being eroded as many on the Right weary of the conflict, worry about the threat of escalation, and wonder why domestic and other foreign policy priorities (read: China) seem to take a back seat.  It might even be that the energy and momentum on the Right are with those who are skeptical of a more activist U.S. role in the conflict, especially regarding blank check spending, the idea of doing whatever it takes for as long as it takes for Ukraine to meet its war aims, or expanding our involvement.

In Washington, the Ukraine maximalists on the Right have dominated in 2022 with key exceptions. Conservative elites in think tanks and congressional offices have vigorously waved the blue and yellow flag while spending the green with little caution. These maximalists so defined the atmosphere in the first half of the year that it wasn’t easy merely raising questions about our approach to Ukraine.  

On the Hill, Congress authorized $113 billion for Ukraine over the course of four aid packages passed in 2022. The big Republican names on the Hill have been especially supportive of Ukraine, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell. The one clean bill, voted on in May 2022, was supported by a large majority of Republicans.  Only 11 Republican Senators and 57 Republican House members voted against it. 

Yet that opposition represented some important erosion of Republican support for Ukraine from earlier in the year. Moreover, it showed a key split in the party and the conservative movement on foreign policy that had been growing for years. As neoconservative analyst Dalibor Rohac noted about the vote, “The foreign policy fissure within the Republican Party was on full display.”

Despite Republican Hill majorities still largely supportive of Ukraine, shifts on the Right continued in the second half of the year and into 2023. Today, many more Republicans are skeptical that the maximalists are correct. The balance of power on the Hill changed due to both erosion and to some fresh blood.  In terms of the former, Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene (GA) explained that “There’s been a change within our conference. There’s just a few of us who voted no from the beginning, but each spending bill that came through our numbers grew.” To this has been added new members like Senator J.D. Vance, who has been a strong and articulate voice of restraint on foreign policy for some time, while the House freshman class added Ukraine skeptics too, including Andy Ogles (Tenn.), Anna Paulina Luna and Cory Mills (both of Florida), and Eli Crane (Ariz.).

The change in the caucus – and in the power of the Speaker — may be significant enough that a new aid package, especially a clean bill, would be tough to push through.  It is also worth noting that growing support for Ukraine aid accountability suggests the maximalists too are feeling some heat.  

The source of opposition on the Right isn’t always clear or the same for each member. For those like Sens. Rand Paul, Mike Lee, and Vance, it seems more philosophical than purely political; they embrace a different, more restrained grand strategic vision for how to secure our country. For others, it could be more constituent driven and partisan. Polling and what representatives are hearing suggest that Republican voters are becoming more skeptical of the U.S. (and Biden’s) approach to Ukraine. 

As Representative Kelly Armstrong (N.D.) told Axios: “When people are seeing a 13% increase in grocery prices; energy, utility bills doubling … if you’re a border community and you’re being overrun by migrants and fentanyl, Ukraine is the furthest thing from your mind.”  For some like Senator Josh Hawley (as well as former Trump appointee Bridge Colby), dubbed “The Prioritisers” by one scholarly analysis, they worry that Ukraine maximalism takes resource and attention away from more pressing priorities like China and Taiwan.     

The erosion of the maximalists’ dominance during 2022 was also shaped by what key Republican and conservative voices off the Hill added to the debate as the war in Ukraine continued to grind along.  For example, under the new leadership of Kevin Roberts, the Heritage Foundation (and Heritage Action) put down markers against a blank check approach to Ukraine aid. Heritage Action warned that the May Ukraine aid package put “America last.” 

Likewise, the Center for Renewing America, headed by Russ Vought (formerly of the Trump administration), pushed back regularly against the Ukraine maximalists. These groups echoed longer run opposition to the U.S. approach to Ukraine, before and after the invasion, from Stand Together (Koch), as well as institutions like Defense Priorities, The American Conservative, and the Cato Institute. By November 2022, a broad coalition of right-of-center voices signed a letter to, as Axios described it, press “lawmakers to delay consideration of any additional aid to Ukraine until the new Congress is sworn in.” This included Stand Together and affiliates, the Heritage Foundation, FreedomWorks, Conservative Partnership Institute, American Moment, and even the America First Policy Institute (with General Keith Kellogg signing).

Clearly, the Right is not monolithic and there is a significant base of support for an alternative, more realist approach.    

One of the more interesting aspects of the divisions on the Right regarding Ukraine policy is how it is playing out with announced and likely candidates for the Republican party’s 2024 presidential nomination.  What is most remarkable is that the two figures who lead early polls (and are more likely to win the nomination) have positioned themselves on the more restrained side of the debate. Former president Donald Trump (and his son Donald Jr.) have aggressively lambasted the establishment position. Florida governor Ron DeSantis has also embraced skepticism about the do whatever it takes approach. 

Given the importance of elite cue-giving in shaping public opinion on foreign policy, Trump and DeSantis’ skepticism around the Republican establishment’s view on Ukraine could provide an important window into how the party’s base will look the closer we get to 2024 and the longer the war goes on.  

While Trump or DeSantis are more likely to get the party’s nod than any others, more maximalist voices are also in the 2024 mix. Nikki Haley, Mike Pence, and Mike Pompeo represent the Republican establishment and have signaled strong support for Ukraine. Moreover, their general approach to U.S. grand strategy and particular issues suggests little difference with how Biden and McConnell have been approaching the conflict. It would likely be back to the future with any of them.  

Yet despite the strong pushback, the elite on the Right is still supportive of both primacy and the Ukrainian maximalist position. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnnell was correct that, as CNN reported: “Reports about the death of Republican support for strong American leadership in the world have been greatly exaggerated. … Don’t look at Twitter, look at people in power. Republican leaders are committed to a strong trans-Atlantic alliance. We are committed to helping Ukraine.”  

For those who want the U.S. to support Ukraine to the hilt, this should provide some succor. For others, McConnell’s dose of cold water shows that they have a lot more work to do to win on this particular issue and on the broader fight to change America’s strategic culture and our grand strategy. 

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/23/ukraine-maximalists-on-the-right-still-dominate-but-for-how-long/