Explaining Islamic extremism

• MAHESH SACHDEV

To imagine that there is a single, religious rationale to the terror that is rocking the Islamic world is to miss its complex underbelly.

For well over a decade, experts have narrowed their searchlights on religious stimuli to explain the extremism and tumult that has roiled much of the Islamic world. The phenomenon was interpreted variously as a crusade against Christianity, a jihad against non-believers, or a war against irreligious rulers.

To the perpetrators of terror, these descriptions became an attractive war-cry to invoke the glorious history of Islamic conquests, rally the faithful, and convert them into mujahids (holy warriors). To opponents, the phrasing helped demonise the Islamists by labelling them as medieval anarchists or fanatics.

To the so-called experts, the religious lexicon was a godsend. The Cold War had ended, and Islamic extremism gave them a new and esoteric glossary to dip into. Soon, a prolific industry had sprung up, spinning seemingly erudite theories, all suitably peppered with Islamic jargon.

The search for a Universal Theory of Islamic Extremism is, however, misdirected. The reality, as always, is more complex and also more prosaic. Without denying the role of religion, there may be other drivers at play, singly or in concert, impacting the rise of Islamic extremism.

Ethnicity

Sociological divisions such as tribes and castes often predate organised religion. In some corners of the contemporary Islamic world, the hold of ethnicity is often comparable to that of religion. It is not an either-or situation, with religion often infused with long-prevailing tribal customs, which form a complex mosaic of values providing identity and cohesion.

For instance, Boko Haram’s main catchment area is the Kanuri tribe in north-eastern Nigeria, as well as the three neighbouring countries of Niger, Cameroon and Chad. Boko Haram’s area of operations is predominantly Sunni Muslim, but the tightly-knit operational core consists mainly of Kanuris, who hark back to their golden pre-colonial era. The Kanuris were a proud civilisation till the early 20th century, who gained riches and prominence with their control of trans-African land trade routes. The Boko Haram leadership, including their leader Abubakar Shekhau, has tried to widen its reach by using the Hausa language, the regional lingua franca, with no spectacular results; their Hausa co-religionists remain sceptical. Experts pontificate about the implications of Shekhau declaring allegiance to the Daesh Caliphate, but the ground reality is predicated on Kanuri tribalism.

Similarly, although reams have been written on the phoenix-like rise of the Daula Islamiya fi Iraq wa Sham (the Islamic State in Iraq and Lavant, better known by its Arabic acronym of Daesh,) and a grand multinational coalition is struggling to contain it, its tribal linkages are rarely mentioned. Daesh has leveraged the Shammar network, believed to be the largest and most powerful tribe of West Asia. The Shammar are based in Hail in northern Saudi Arabia but with followers and sub-tribes in Iraq, Jordan, Syria and even Turkey. At its peak, the Shammar and their cohorts ruled much of the Arabian Peninsula and southern Iraq. The late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was a Shammar from his mother’s side. While Shammars can be found on both sides of the Daesh conflict, many Gulf Arabs allegedly bankrolling the organisation are believed to be linked to the Shammar. For instance, the perpetrators of the two bombings of the Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia last month were from Hail.

Political misgovernment

Islamic tumult can often be traced back to governance issues. Many of these countries have essentially been dictatorships backed by either armed forces or a dominant tribe. The system has usually lacked participation and is marked by maladministration, endemic corruption and repression. These factors, coupled with dire economic conditions, have created a combustible combination. In the Maghreb countries of North Africa such as Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, this phenomenon came to be called Hogra or the impunity that the ruling class enjoyed, and was deeply resented by the rest. The resultant political dynamics were exploited by religious groups, often the only organised opposition with a degree of legitimacy. Religious extremists played a highly opportunistic role, but their contribution was played up by both sides of the divide.

Power vacuum and outreach

The perceived lack of a strong central authority, in countries such as Somalia after Siad Barre or Libya after Muammar Qaddafi, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal, was seen as an open invitation for motley groups to fill the political void. Most of the times, they have created a rogue fief using Islamism as a flag of convenience — for instance, Somali pirates with Al-Shabaab. Subsequently, however, the tail has often wagged the dog.

Geopolitical outreach is perhaps easiest to understand. A foreign sponsor uses Islam as a Trojan horse for expansionism. Pakistan’s long-standing backing for the Mujahidin and the Taliban in Afghanistan is an obvious example of this strategy. Even non-Muslim powers have not been averse to using Islam as justification. The CIA openly funded the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Red Army. In such cases, the precise mix between religious and secular motives is often calibrated, depending on the targeted audience.

It is, clear, therefore, that Islamic extremism is not monolithic. During the long Cold War, the West often painted the Comintern in similar simplistic and exaggerated terms, making various errors of judgement in the process. Islamic extremism is a serious threat with an impact well beyond its direct theatre of operations. However, ignoring the nuances of the various stimuli that fuel it would only amount to repeating history, with similar outcomes.

(Mahesh Sachdev, a retired Indian diplomat, is an Arabist. He served as Ambassador to Algeria and as High Commissioner to Nigeria.)

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/explaining-islamic-extremism/article7426088.ece?homepage=true