Chilcot's joy at progress may be stymied by mandarins' meddling

Despite veneer of transparency; protocols, conventions and good old fashioned secrecy may lessen documents' impact

Richard Norton-Taylor

This was the breakthrough the long-delayed Chilcot inquiry was waiting for, though it is less than it wanted and privately feels it should have had.

Sir John Chilcot's demand to publish what he has called key evidence – some 25 of Tony Blair's notes to George Bush in the runup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and more than 130 records of conversations between the two leaders – will be diluted by a compromise.

Under increasing pressure to publish his report, now more than two years late, Chilcot repeats his insistence that the content of the documents are "vital to the public understanding of the inquiry's conclusions".

So after years of sometimes intense argument with successive cabinet secretaries, the two sides have agreed that a "small number of extracts" or the "gist" of the documents' contents will be released. In deference to US sensitivities, none of the published material will "reflect" Bush's views.

Whitehall will thus be able to say that the principle that records of private conversations between a British prime minister and foreign heads of government (especially American) will never be released has not been breached.

It will also be able to say that the content of cabinet and cabinet committee meetings will not be published, not for 20 or 30 years at any rate. For Chilcot said on Thursday that it will release information "in relation to" those cabinet meetings.

Blair was able to say this week that the delay in the Chilcot report was nothing to do with him. It was easy to say since he was well aware of the significance of the struggle between Chilcot and the Cabinet Office. Ministers and the Whitehall machine have been putting it about that the delay was the result of Washington's opposition to releasing the content of the documents. That was far from the full story.

Now the "Maxwellisation" process – its name comes from a case involving Robert Maxwell – whereby those whom the inquiry intends to criticise will receive the relevant draft passages before publication of the final report – can begin in earnest. Blair is likely to be at the top of the list, which is expected to include Jack Straw, foreign secretary at the time, Sir Richard Dearlove, then head of MI6, and Lord Goldsmith, then attorney general.

Chilcot pointedly made it clear that it was a bit rich for cabinet secretaries to stop the release of the documents given that Blair and his closest advisers, including Jonathan Powell and Alastair Campbell, had been allowed to publish freely on the same events and the same private conversations.

It is quite likely Chilcot was always personally aware that Whitehall would never agree to the full publication of the documents but had to be seen to try hard to get them.

Chilcot still faces his ultimate test – whether his report's content and conclusions are both credible, and substantiated by the evidence his panel was given. We know that the intelligence was skewed, that the armed forces were not prepared for the invasion, that the cabinet was not kept informed properly about the military plans or negotiations at the UN.

What we still don't know are the promises or messages Blair gave Bush without telling the British parliament or public. Hopefully, we will finally now find out before the end of the year.

http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/29/chilcot-joy-stymied-manadarins-documents