Israel kicks its most important ally

Israel kicks its most important ally in the shins over Iran nuclear deal

Netanyahu has not only weakened his leverage with the United States, he's weakened it with the other members of the P5+1

Michael Cohen

When word came from Geneva that there was a deal with Iran on its nuclear program, the Israeli government faced a clear choice – support the agreement and call for continued vigilance in preventing Iran from getting a deal or blast the agreement as inadequate.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose, not surprisingly, the latter course labeling the deal an "historic mistake". In the process he has further isolated Israel and widened what may be the most serious rift in US-Israel relations in two decades.

The crux of the growing US-Israel divide is the fact that the two countries simply don't see eye-to-eye on Iran's nuclear program. The Israelis want a complete dismantling of Iran's capabilities – a position that is unrealistic and short of using military force is never going to happen. Iran has progressed so far along the road to developing a nuclear capability that the issue today is what is the best way to slow the program and prevent Iran from going nuclear rather than reversing it.

Indeed, if Netanyahu stepped back from his red line, he might actually realize that the deal signed in Geneva goes a long way towards meeting that goal. In fact, it is rather shocking the number of concessions the US and its western allies were able to secure in Geneva without giving up that much in return. Under the agreement, Iran must stop all uranium enrichment above 5% and neutralize its stockpile of uranium that has been enriched to 20%. In addition, Iran must halt construction at the Arak nuclear reactor (which was potentially capable of producing plutonium for a bomb) and end the production, installation and maintenance of centrifuges used for enrichment purposes.

While these steps will not ultimately prevent Iran from getting enough material to make a bomb, they will certainly stop the process, a far better result than no deal at all. Perhaps most important, Iran has agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to have daily access to Iran's two major enrichment facilities – a level of transparency that the Arms Control Association rightly calls "unprecedented". These inspection measures will make it virtually impossible for Iran to pursue "breakout" nuclear capabilities without detection.

And what is Iran getting in return? Frankly, not much. The biggest carrot is relief from international sanctions – to the tune of approximately $7bn. This is not chump change, but considering that about $100bn in Iranian overseas assets will remain frozen and the vast architecture of international and unilateral sanctions will remain in place, it isn't that much, either. If anything, the continued pain caused by these sanctions is incentive enough for Iran to offer further concessions in negotiations toward a final agreement.

In fact, the Iranians have to know that a failure to abide by this temporary deal will basically ensure that sanctions will likely never be lifted against them. If Iran prefers having a bomb to having a functioning economy than theoretically they'd be OK with that. But then why enter talks in the first place; and why agree to such intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities? Iran could just as easily continue to develop its capability and present the world with a fait accompli. Signing on that bottom line in Geneva has put enormous pressure on Iran to live up to its obligations or face dire consequences.

That Netanyahu describes these advances as a "mistake" is a reflection of how isolated he's made Israel on the Iran issue. No one – not even Israel's new bestie, France – is going to stand on that wall for the complete removal of Iran's nuclear program. In the pursuit of the perfect deal for Israel, they've made themselves into the enemy of the good.

The impact on US-Israel relations, however, could be more serious. The bonds between the US and Israel are too strong to be irreparably changed by this agreement (and Netanyahu's rhetoric), and the White House is already taking steps to ratchet down the heat. But increasingly, it seems clear that the current Israeli government is in denial about US policy toward the Middle East. America is not sprinting to the region's exits, but it's certainly taking a brisk walk in that direction. Getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan; resisting intervention in Syria; seeking to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and making a deal with Iran are the actions of a nation finally waking up to – and executing on – the fact that US engagement in the Middle East brings with it more costs than benefits.

This isn't a blip; it's the new reality in the Middle East and Netanyahu's harsh condemnation of the deal made in Geneva – a deal made in large measure to safeguard Israel's security – will only serve to reinforce the view among US policymakers and in particular President Obama that they're on the right path.

This is not to say that Netanyahu shouldn't do what he thinks is best for his nation, and if he thinks the deal is a bad one, he's well within his rights to say so. But kicking Israel's most important ally in the shins, denigrating their diplomatic efforts, darkly hinting that they will unilaterally use military force and seeking to upend what is clearly one of President Obama's key foreign policy priorities, nuclear non-proliferation, is incredibly unwise.

By taking such a position, Netanyahu has not only weakened his leverage with the United States, he's weakened it with the other members of the P5+1. Over the next six months, as Iran and the P5+1 seek to forge a comprehensive agreement, Israel's ability to influence that deal – and the US negotiating positions – will be shaped by their public stance and their willingness to accept something less than an ideal solution. If the last 48 hours are any indication, they're not off to a good start.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/26/israel-iran-nuclear-deal-historic-mistake