Canberra must learn to live with China's power

The Australian government doesn't appreciate China’s growing confidence

The row in the East China Sea between China, the US and Japan has created an ugly rip in Australia’s relations with Beijing. Canberra must learn to live with China's power

Hugh White

Tony Abbott and Julie Bishop came to office determined to tie Australia more closely than ever to the US, and to develop further our rapidly growing defence and strategic relationship with Japan. They assumed they could do this without damaging the all-important relationship with China. 

That was because they didn’t believe the talk about the escalating strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing, or the bitter enmity between Beijing and Tokyo. They didn’t comprehend China’s growing power and confidence. And they didn’t understand the fine line that previous Australian governments had learned to tread between the US and China on these issues.

This week they found out their mistakes, when Beijing responded so sternly to their reprimand over the declaration of an air defence information zone [ADIZ]. As such, the very serious situation in the East China Sea has now created an ugly rip in Australia’s relations with China. The question now is whether Abbott and Bishop can profit from the lesson this provides, repair the damage made to their relation with Beijing, and start to contribute to lowering tensions in Northeast Asia, instead of helping to fan them?

Of course, Bishop is right to be worried about China’s ADIZ. It has stoked the already dangerous confrontation in the East China Sea, and raised the risk of catastrophic conflict between the US and China. She is also right to have decided she should express her concerns. But she is wrong not to have seen that the way she went about it, combined with the broader policy directions of the new government, would create a counter-productive reaction from Beijing.

For context: the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands has nothing to do with these uninhabited rocks themselves, or even with the resources that might lie around them. It is about how Asia learns to live with China’s growing power. That is why the stakes are so high, and the dangers so serious.

China believes that its growing weight should be matched by growing status in the region. It no longer accepts subordination to US leadership, and seeks at least some kind of equal partnership. The US wants to remain the leader in Asia, and thinks China should be happy with that. Japan fears that the more space China gets, the more it will squeeze them.

China’s military pressure over the disputed islands is designed to force the US to back off from its support for Tokyo, thus weakening Washington’s leadership in Asia and showing Tokyo who is boss. It is a high-risk strategy and sets some very bad precedents.

On the other hand Beijing believes that the US and Japan are determined to resist any serious accommodation of China, and that only stern actions like this will force them to take China’s ambitions seriously. Meanwhile, Tokyo feels it must urge Washington to stand up to China or risk falling under China’s shadow.

They are all right to some extent, which is what makes the situation so complex. Australia’s interests are best served by a deal which gives something to everyone. America does need to make some space for China, and treat it as an equal partner in Asia. China does need to forgo the use of force to settle disputes, and accept that it can’t exclude America from Asia. Japan needs to be given iron-clad assurances of its future security.

All this requires exceptional diplomacy to help avoid further escalating strategic tensions and a growing risk of major war. Instead, the Abbott government has chosen simply to side with the US and Japan against China, calling Japan "Australia’s best friend in Asia", encouraging it to take a bigger military role, promising more basing for US forces in Australia, and generally behaving as if it is eager to join the US and Japan in containing China’s aspirations.

 All this only stokes Beijing’s belief that it will have to throw its weight around before the rest of us take its demands seriously. And of course it guarantees damage to our long-term relationship with Beijing. If Bishop and Abbott really believe, as they claim to, that none of this will affect Australia’s economic relationship with Beijing, they are in for a nasty shock. 

The Abbott government, like its Labor predecessor, is struggling to come to terms with the new political and strategic reality in Asia. They want to believe that Asia can be fundamentally transformed economically, but remain completely unchanged strategically, with American power still calling all the shots. 

Abbott’s deep-seated conservatism means he would dearly love that old order to last for ever. Hopefully his pragmatism will allow the harsh new reality to intrude. As we grow rich on China’s growing economy, we must learn to live with its growing power.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/29/the-australian-government-doesnt-appreciate-chinas-growing-confidence