#Iran’s Emerging “Offensive Doctrine” is Becoming Clearer
https://x.com/HamidRezaAz/status/2091290948558881210
#Iran’s Emerging “Offensive Doctrine” is Becoming Clearer
Over the past day, several senior Iranian military and security officials elaborated on what the shift from a defensive to an offensive military strategy actually means.
Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military adviser to the Supreme Leader, said Iran’s response to threats must be “preemptive and calculated” in order to deter the enemy from even contemplating aggression.
There’s an important logic here. After the failure of Iran’s previous deterrence model to prevent repeated U.S. and Israeli attacks, Tehran appears to be trying to establish deterrence at an earlier stage, by signaling that even preparations for an attack could trigger an Iranian response.
Army spokesman Mohammad Akraminia added another dimension. He explicitly described Iran’s July 17 attack on a U.S. base in Jordan as an example of a “preemptive operation” under the new offensive doctrine.
But he also said that any actual aggression would be met immediately, and that Iran’s response could be broader than the original attack.
So, there appear to be two distinct elements to the emerging doctrine: preemption, aimed at preventing a perceived threat from materializing; and disproportionate retaliation, aimed at raising the cost of any attack that does occur.
The terminology is, in itself, important. Iranian officials have traditionally avoided formally describing widely-used concepts such as “forward defense” as formal military doctrines. Yet in recent weeks, Chief of Staff Ali Abdollahi and now other senior officials have repeatedly and explicitly referred to an “offensive doctrine.”
This suggests the shift is increasingly being presented not simply as a wartime adjustment, but as a more lasting change in Iranian military thinking.
Mohsen Rezaei, the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has now extended this logic beyond direct military threats. He warned that additional U.S. forces deployed to regional bases could become targets, as could certain U.S. activities around the Strait of Hormuz and contacts with Iranian separatist groups.
More importantly, Rezaei warned Iran’s neighbors against participating in Trump’s economic warfare. If they do, he said, “not even a drop of oil” would leave the Persian Gulf, including through alternative export routes outside Hormuz.
That is essentially an ultimatum to the Gulf states, that participation in U.S. economic pressure could increasingly be treated by Tehran as part of the broader confrontation.
There is also a nuclear dimension. Rezaei argued that U.S. attacks have demonstrated that NPT membership and IAEA safeguards provide no protection against military action, asking why countries should refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons if abiding by international rules does not protect them.
Meanwhile, a hardline MP from the Paydari camp says parliament is working on legislation for Iran to withdraw from the NPT, apparently with Rezaei’s support.
None of this necessarily means Iran has decided to build nuclear weapons. But it shows how military, economic, and nuclear deterrence debates are increasingly converging around the same conclusion, that the previous framework failed to protect Iran and therefore needs to change.
Recent statements also show that, as I mentioned before, Iranian officials are reacting differently to the increasing U.S. pressure and Trump’s economic warfare. While the heads of the executive and legislative branches still appear to favor diplomacy as the way forward, the military-security establishment is increasingly preparing for another round of escalation.
Over the past day, several senior Iranian military and security officials elaborated on what the shift from a defensive to an offensive military strategy actually means.
Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military adviser to the Supreme Leader, said Iran’s response to threats must be “preemptive and calculated” in order to deter the enemy from even contemplating aggression.
There’s an important logic here. After the failure of Iran’s previous deterrence model to prevent repeated U.S. and Israeli attacks, Tehran appears to be trying to establish deterrence at an earlier stage, by signaling that even preparations for an attack could trigger an Iranian response.
Army spokesman Mohammad Akraminia added another dimension. He explicitly described Iran’s July 17 attack on a U.S. base in Jordan as an example of a “preemptive operation” under the new offensive doctrine.
But he also said that any actual aggression would be met immediately, and that Iran’s response could be broader than the original attack.
So, there appear to be two distinct elements to the emerging doctrine: preemption, aimed at preventing a perceived threat from materializing; and disproportionate retaliation, aimed at raising the cost of any attack that does occur.
The terminology is, in itself, important. Iranian officials have traditionally avoided formally describing widely-used concepts such as “forward defense” as formal military doctrines. Yet in recent weeks, Chief of Staff Ali Abdollahi and now other senior officials have repeatedly and explicitly referred to an “offensive doctrine.”
This suggests the shift is increasingly being presented not simply as a wartime adjustment, but as a more lasting change in Iranian military thinking.
Mohsen Rezaei, the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has now extended this logic beyond direct military threats. He warned that additional U.S. forces deployed to regional bases could become targets, as could certain U.S. activities around the Strait of Hormuz and contacts with Iranian separatist groups.
More importantly, Rezaei warned Iran’s neighbors against participating in Trump’s economic warfare. If they do, he said, “not even a drop of oil” would leave the Persian Gulf, including through alternative export routes outside Hormuz.
That is essentially an ultimatum to the Gulf states, that participation in U.S. economic pressure could increasingly be treated by Tehran as part of the broader confrontation.
There is also a nuclear dimension. Rezaei argued that U.S. attacks have demonstrated that NPT membership and IAEA safeguards provide no protection against military action, asking why countries should refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons if abiding by international rules does not protect them.
Meanwhile, a hardline MP from the Paydari camp says parliament is working on legislation for Iran to withdraw from the NPT, apparently with Rezaei’s support.
None of this necessarily means Iran has decided to build nuclear weapons. But it shows how military, economic, and nuclear deterrence debates are increasingly converging around the same conclusion, that the previous framework failed to protect Iran and therefore needs to change.
Recent statements also show that, as I mentioned before, Iranian officials are reacting differently to the increasing U.S. pressure and Trump’s economic warfare. While the heads of the executive and legislative branches still appear to favor diplomacy as the way forward, the military-security establishment is increasingly preparing for another round of escalation.
posted by Satish Sharma at
03:52
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