https://x.com/ibrahimtmajed/status/2012918102011392389
𝐅𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐜 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐇𝐲𝐛𝐫𝐢𝐝 𝐖𝐚𝐫: 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐅𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐞𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐃𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐳𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐫𝐚𝐧
What began as an economic protest in Iran at the end of December 2025 rapidly evolved into something far more dangerous: a coordinated hybrid operation combining economic pressure, internal sabotage, psychological warfare, and foreign intelligence activation.
The events that unfolded were not spontaneous, nor were they confined to domestic grievances.
Instead, they revealed a familiar pattern, one in which legitimate economic suffering is weaponized by external actors seeking strategic gains that could not be achieved through direct military confrontation.
This article examines the trajectory of the unrest, the role of foreign intervention, the mechanisms employed by the Iranian state to contain and defeat the operation, and the broader geopolitical implications of what ultimately became a failed attempt at internal destabilization.
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐅𝐥𝐚𝐦𝐞: 𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐜 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐚𝐬 𝐚𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐏𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐭
On December 28, 2025, demonstrations erupted in Iran’s major cities, led primarily by Bazaar tradesmen in Tehran protesting worsening economic conditions.
The protests were initially narrow in scope and economic in nature, driven by currency collapse, inflation, and declining purchasing power.
By the end of 2025, the Iranian rial had fallen to over 1.4 million per US dollar on unofficial markets, compared to 820,000 a year earlier. Inflation exceeded 52%, GDP growth hovered around 0.6%, and sanctions, particularly those imposed by the United States, continued to restrict oil exports, financial transactions, and access to the international banking system.
The government’s decision to cancel the “preferential currency” rate triggered immediate backlash from large traders, even though the measure was part of a broader effort to slow currency collapse and reduce dependency on the US dollar.
Iran simultaneously pursued alternatives: trade in local currencies, gold reserves, digital mechanisms, deeper alignment with China and Russia, and integration into blocs such as BRICS.
At this stage, the demonstrations remained peaceful and limited.
That would soon change.
𝐅𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬
Within days, the demonstrations were hijacked.
Organized groups infiltrated the protests, shifting them from economic demands to violence, arson, and direct confrontation with the state.
What emerged was not civil unrest, but a security operation conducted from within.
Over the course of approximately 11 days, coordinated acts of violence spread across 21 provinces, including Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Kermanshah.
Targets included mosques, holy sites, public infrastructure, military and police facilities, and emergency services.
In some cases, rioters attempted to block firefighting and rescue teams.
In Mashhad alone, damages to public property were estimated at 2 billion tomans.
Thirty-five mosques were attacked, and religious symbols were deliberately targeted, clear indicators that the objective had shifted from protest to destabilization.
Despite these provocations, Iranian security forces initially exercised strict restraint.
Police units were ordered not to use firearms, even when attacked.
Videos circulated showing officers pursuing armed attackers without lethal force, underscoring a deliberate strategy: identify, isolate, and dismantle the network rather than escalate into open confrontation.
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐧 𝐎𝐛𝐣𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞: 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞, 𝐅𝐫𝐚𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐦𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐩𝐬𝐞
The unrest aligned precisely with long-standing foreign objectives toward Iran: internal fracture rather than external war.
Unable to break Iran through sanctions, isolation, or direct military confrontation, adversarial powers sought to exploit economic hardship as an operational opening. The aim was to transform social pressure into a security crisis severe enough to force political concessions, or trigger regime collapse.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi explicitly framed the unrest as an attempt to achieve through internal chaos what had failed during previous military confrontations.
According to Araqchi, the killing and escalation were intended to provoke US intervention and advance Israeli strategic interests.
This was not merely a street battle.
It was a compound war, combining intelligence operations, terrorist cells, media manipulation, psychological pressure, and digital warfare.
𝐌𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐂𝐨𝐠𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐖𝐚𝐫𝐟𝐚𝐫𝐞
Parallel to the violence on the ground was an aggressive information campaign.
Old and fabricated videos circulated widely, edited to suggest mass uprisings and regime collapse. Social media platforms amplified selective footage to manufacture a sense of inevitability and momentum.
Universities and schools were targeted digitally, with content designed to provoke emotional rather than political responses.
The goal was not persuasion but demoralization, aimed at eroding trust in state institutions and convincing the public that resistance was futile.
This cognitive warfare relied heavily on continued internet access, something Iranian authorities initially allowed in order to track networks and identify coordinators.
𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐝𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭
From the earliest days, foreign political endorsement was explicit.
The US State Department publicly declared support for the demonstrators in Persian-language statements.
Senior American officials, including the US ambassador to the UN, framed the unrest as a struggle against “extremism”.
By January 2, 2026, President Donald Trump personally escalated the rhetoric, warning of readiness to intervene and promoting narratives of regime collapse.
Israeli involvement, though more operational than rhetorical, was equally clear.
Mossad-linked accounts openly incited participation, while Israeli officials privately monitored developments.
The pattern resembled previous “color revolution” models: external encouragement, internal coordination, and media amplification.
Reza Pahlavi, son of the former Shah, attempted to position himself as an alternative leader, openly appealing to Washington and Europe for support and calling for coordinated street action.
His efforts, however, failed to translate into mass mobilization.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗲: 𝗔 𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝘆
𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗢𝗻𝗲: 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁
Authorities prioritized restraint and dialogue.
Economic mitigation measures were introduced, including increasing monthly cash support for low-income citizens. Media coverage avoided exaggeration, and internet access remained open.
𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗧𝘄𝗼: 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗱 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗔𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻
Once the terrorist nature of the operation became clear, security forces moved decisively, but selectively. Hundreds of operatives were arrested, weapons caches seized, and infiltration routes disrupted.
Intelligence agencies identified Mossad-linked networks and foreign-backed groups, including operatives connected to Komala and PJAK.
𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗧𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗲: 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗶𝘀𝗶𝘃𝗲𝗻𝗲𝘀𝘀
After key networks were exposed, nationwide internet access was restricted, Starlink connections were blocked, and full security mobilization followed.
Within days, authorities dismantled operational cells, arrested approximately 2,400 operatives, and neutralized others. The internal war was effectively contained.
𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗙𝗼𝘂𝗿: 𝗣𝗼𝗽𝘂𝗹𝗮𝗿 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿-𝗠𝗼𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘇𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻
Perhaps the most decisive factor was the public response.
Millions took to the streets across Iran in spontaneous pro-state demonstrations, rejecting foreign intervention and denouncing the violence.
This popular legitimacy collapsed the external narrative of a nation on the brink.
𝗢𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗰 𝗔𝘀𝘀𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁
By mid-January 2026, even Western analytical institutions acknowledged a sharp decline in unrest. The operation failed due to several factors:
𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗴𝘁𝗵𝘀:
-Institutional cohesion
- Advanced intelligence capabilities
- Rapid operational coordination
- High political awareness among the population
- Lack of credible opposition leadership
𝗘𝘅𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀:
- Declining US credibility
- Regional unwillingness to support destabilization
- Competing US strategic commitments
- Israeli overreliance on covert disruption
The gap between online enthusiasm and real-world participation proved decisive. Digital noise could not replace mass legitimacy.
𝗙𝘂𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗥𝗶𝘀𝗸𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗹𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀
While the operation failed, the strategy has not been abandoned.
Economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, and information warfare will continue. However, the events of early 2026 demonstrated a critical reality: Iran’s internal cohesion, when activated, remains its strongest defense.
What unfolded was not a protest movement crushed by force, but a hybrid operation defeated by a combination of intelligence, restraint, and popular rejection.
The lesson is clear, destabilization from within is not guaranteed success, especially when society recognizes the hand guiding the chaos.
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐅𝐥𝐚𝐦𝐞: 𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐜 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐚𝐬 𝐚𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐏𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐭
On December 28, 2025, demonstrations erupted in Iran’s major cities, led primarily by Bazaar tradesmen in Tehran protesting worsening economic conditions.
The protests were initially narrow in scope and economic in nature, driven by currency collapse, inflation, and declining purchasing power.
By the end of 2025, the Iranian rial had fallen to over 1.4 million per US dollar on unofficial markets, compared to 820,000 a year earlier. Inflation exceeded 52%, GDP growth hovered around 0.6%, and sanctions, particularly those imposed by the United States, continued to restrict oil exports, financial transactions, and access to the international banking system.
The government’s decision to cancel the “preferential currency” rate triggered immediate backlash from large traders, even though the measure was part of a broader effort to slow currency collapse and reduce dependency on the US dollar.
Iran simultaneously pursued alternatives: trade in local currencies, gold reserves, digital mechanisms, deeper alignment with China and Russia, and integration into blocs such as BRICS.
At this stage, the demonstrations remained peaceful and limited.
That would soon change.
𝐅𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬
Within days, the demonstrations were hijacked.
Organized groups infiltrated the protests, shifting them from economic demands to violence, arson, and direct confrontation with the state.
What emerged was not civil unrest, but a security operation conducted from within.
Over the course of approximately 11 days, coordinated acts of violence spread across 21 provinces, including Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Kermanshah.
Targets included mosques, holy sites, public infrastructure, military and police facilities, and emergency services.
In some cases, rioters attempted to block firefighting and rescue teams.
In Mashhad alone, damages to public property were estimated at 2 billion tomans.
Thirty-five mosques were attacked, and religious symbols were deliberately targeted, clear indicators that the objective had shifted from protest to destabilization.
Despite these provocations, Iranian security forces initially exercised strict restraint.
Police units were ordered not to use firearms, even when attacked.
Videos circulated showing officers pursuing armed attackers without lethal force, underscoring a deliberate strategy: identify, isolate, and dismantle the network rather than escalate into open confrontation.
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐧 𝐎𝐛𝐣𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞: 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞, 𝐅𝐫𝐚𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐦𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐩𝐬𝐞
The unrest aligned precisely with long-standing foreign objectives toward Iran: internal fracture rather than external war.
Unable to break Iran through sanctions, isolation, or direct military confrontation, adversarial powers sought to exploit economic hardship as an operational opening. The aim was to transform social pressure into a security crisis severe enough to force political concessions, or trigger regime collapse.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi explicitly framed the unrest as an attempt to achieve through internal chaos what had failed during previous military confrontations.
According to Araqchi, the killing and escalation were intended to provoke US intervention and advance Israeli strategic interests.
This was not merely a street battle.
It was a compound war, combining intelligence operations, terrorist cells, media manipulation, psychological pressure, and digital warfare.
𝐌𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐂𝐨𝐠𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐖𝐚𝐫𝐟𝐚𝐫𝐞
Parallel to the violence on the ground was an aggressive information campaign.
Old and fabricated videos circulated widely, edited to suggest mass uprisings and regime collapse. Social media platforms amplified selective footage to manufacture a sense of inevitability and momentum.
Universities and schools were targeted digitally, with content designed to provoke emotional rather than political responses.
The goal was not persuasion but demoralization, aimed at eroding trust in state institutions and convincing the public that resistance was futile.
This cognitive warfare relied heavily on continued internet access, something Iranian authorities initially allowed in order to track networks and identify coordinators.
𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐝𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭
From the earliest days, foreign political endorsement was explicit.
The US State Department publicly declared support for the demonstrators in Persian-language statements.
Senior American officials, including the US ambassador to the UN, framed the unrest as a struggle against “extremism”.
By January 2, 2026, President Donald Trump personally escalated the rhetoric, warning of readiness to intervene and promoting narratives of regime collapse.
Israeli involvement, though more operational than rhetorical, was equally clear.
Mossad-linked accounts openly incited participation, while Israeli officials privately monitored developments.
The pattern resembled previous “color revolution” models: external encouragement, internal coordination, and media amplification.
Reza Pahlavi, son of the former Shah, attempted to position himself as an alternative leader, openly appealing to Washington and Europe for support and calling for coordinated street action.
His efforts, however, failed to translate into mass mobilization.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗲: 𝗔 𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝘆
𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗢𝗻𝗲: 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁
Authorities prioritized restraint and dialogue.
Economic mitigation measures were introduced, including increasing monthly cash support for low-income citizens. Media coverage avoided exaggeration, and internet access remained open.
𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗧𝘄𝗼: 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗱 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗔𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻
Once the terrorist nature of the operation became clear, security forces moved decisively, but selectively. Hundreds of operatives were arrested, weapons caches seized, and infiltration routes disrupted.
Intelligence agencies identified Mossad-linked networks and foreign-backed groups, including operatives connected to Komala and PJAK.
𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗧𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗲: 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗶𝘀𝗶𝘃𝗲𝗻𝗲𝘀𝘀
After key networks were exposed, nationwide internet access was restricted, Starlink connections were blocked, and full security mobilization followed.
Within days, authorities dismantled operational cells, arrested approximately 2,400 operatives, and neutralized others. The internal war was effectively contained.
𝗣𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗙𝗼𝘂𝗿: 𝗣𝗼𝗽𝘂𝗹𝗮𝗿 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿-𝗠𝗼𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘇𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻
Perhaps the most decisive factor was the public response.
Millions took to the streets across Iran in spontaneous pro-state demonstrations, rejecting foreign intervention and denouncing the violence.
This popular legitimacy collapsed the external narrative of a nation on the brink.
𝗢𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗰 𝗔𝘀𝘀𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁
By mid-January 2026, even Western analytical institutions acknowledged a sharp decline in unrest. The operation failed due to several factors:
𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗴𝘁𝗵𝘀:
-Institutional cohesion
- Advanced intelligence capabilities
- Rapid operational coordination
- High political awareness among the population
- Lack of credible opposition leadership
𝗘𝘅𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀:
- Declining US credibility
- Regional unwillingness to support destabilization
- Competing US strategic commitments
- Israeli overreliance on covert disruption
The gap between online enthusiasm and real-world participation proved decisive. Digital noise could not replace mass legitimacy.
𝗙𝘂𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗥𝗶𝘀𝗸𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗹𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀
While the operation failed, the strategy has not been abandoned.
Economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, and information warfare will continue. However, the events of early 2026 demonstrated a critical reality: Iran’s internal cohesion, when activated, remains its strongest defense.
What unfolded was not a protest movement crushed by force, but a hybrid operation defeated by a combination of intelligence, restraint, and popular rejection.
The lesson is clear, destabilization from within is not guaranteed success, especially when society recognizes the hand guiding the chaos.
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